

The Personal Values of Sexuality and of the Transmission of Human Life*

Angel Rodríguez Luño

1 The Personal Values of Human Sexuality

If human sexuality is already a very complex reality from the biological standpoint, it is no less so on the psychological and moral planes. A number of elements are involved in these three planes—elements that must be given proper integration and a certain amount of balance. Consider, for example, the serious psychiatric problems that arise from an inadequate correspondence between the psychological sexual identity and the genetic/gonadal sex (transsexualism), or the problems that medicine must face when gonadal structure is ambiguous or does not conform completely to the genetic and psychological sex. From the ethical standpoint, sexuality appears as an ambit where diverse values and meanings intersect, which profoundly engages the responsibility of the person. The response to these values and meanings generates attitudes that are capable of altering the emotional tone and the ethics linked to sexual life. Consider, for example, the conflicts that arise from a certain attitude toward fertility and sterility. It has been rightly noted that in broad sectors of today's society the bringing of life into the world has ceased to be a source of human joy, only to become a source of untold suffering and

* Extracted from the volume Rodríguez Luño, A. - López Mondéjar, R., *La fecundación "in vitro"*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1986). Translated by Kira Howes.

even of heinous crimes. Some people consider themselves to be oppressed by the force of their fertility: unable to embrace it in its true value, they try to combat it by any and all means. The fear of procreation leads to an altered sexual psychology—and sometimes even biology—no less than to an altered sexual morality; moreover, the concept of the person may subsequently be put into crisis.¹ The attitude toward sterility also raises big problems, equally capable of transforming anthropological conceptions that, until now, were considered indispensable.

The reason for this is that the values inscribed in sexuality are closely linked to the value of the human person. They are personal values, not *utilitarian values*. Significantly diverse concepts such as, on the one hand, *reproduction and mating* and, on the other, *procreation and conjugal communion*, apply to two realities, animal sexuality and human sexuality, which are essentially identical from the biological standpoint. The psychological and moral peculiarity of human sexuality emerges when sexuality is considered as an existential dimension of the human person, and not as the simple biological function of reproduction or as a source of satisfaction and sensual pleasure.

The referencing of sexuality to the value of the person is established at multiple levels and is therefore, complex in itself. Sexual activity refers to the human person inasmuch as the conditions originating from the existence of a new personal being are placed in that activity. In relation to the existing person and statically considered as belonging to one sex, sexuality deeply characterizes the human subject from various points of view: biological, physical, psychological, social, and even spiritual; sex is in the order of the person's *being*, and not in that of his or her *having*. Being that the whole person is subsumed and involved in some way in sexuality, its exercise engages the whole person, and it can be a vehicle for and sign of complete personal giving, as required for the love that enlivens the most basic and stable form of human society: marriage and the family.

Therefore, the intersection of various aspects, each of highly particular value,

¹ Cf. W. Poltawaska, "La fecondità come compito e metodi per realizzarla," in *La procreazione responsabile, Fondamenti filosofici, scientifici, teologici*, Centro Studi e Ricerche sulla Regolazione Naturale della Fertilità (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) – Istituto Giovanni Paolo II per studi su Matrimonio e Famiglia (Rome: Pontificia Università Lateranense, 1984).

takes place in human sexuality. We will first analytically study each one of these aspects, and then we will proceed to a synthesis.

1.1 *Sexuality and Procreation*

That the sexual impulse, understood as the attraction to the opposite sex, has as its intrinsic finality the bringing of life into the world is, from the general biological standpoint, undeniably evident. The conservation of numerous animal species strongly depends on the sexual impulse.

The subsistence of humanity is also linked to the sexual tendency. Moreover, existence is the most basic good of man, as it is the presupposition of all manifestations and achievements of the human. All actions of people, the products of their ingenuity and skill, their works of art, and the fruits of their moral stature have as an essential condition: that man exists; and that the genius, technician, artist, and saint exist.² Thus, the singular value of man's sexuality appears to be as such: *it is destined to give rise to the human person*, it is the ambit where the most valuable being in the visible universe has its origin, a being who has value and full meaning in himself or herself and who, therefore, is not merely just a member of the species.

This simple fact, otherwise abundantly clear, determines one of the personal values of human sexuality. Its objective meaning is not mainly biological, but existential. Its value does not flow from the biological order; it springs forth from the order of existence. "The expressions 'the order of nature' and 'the biological order' must not be confused or regarded as identical, the 'biological order' does indeed mean the same as the order of nature but only insofar as this is accessible to the methods of empirical and descriptive natural science, and not as a specific order of existence with an obvious relationship to the First Cause, to God the Creator."³

² On the order of the sexual tendency toward existence, cf. K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981), 56-57.

³ Wojtyła, K. *Love and Responsibility*, 56-57, (our translation of the author's translation). The distinction between the biological order and order of existence is very clear in

The relationship between human sexuality and the divine work of Creation is understood from a few basic ideas. Man is the only creature that God willed for its own sake. This implies that the person who comes into existence is immediately conceived of and willed by God, who creates through His Wisdom and Love, and not because of the need of a triggered cosmic instinct.⁴ Thus, no person is the fruit, casual or necessary, of a mere biological mechanism. There is a projection and divine decision in the origin of each rational being.⁵

The procreative capacity inscribed in human sexuality thus reveals its most profound meaning: the capacity to cooperate with God, “participation in His own creative power.”⁶ The explanation offered by Caffarra seems very clear

itself, but it can present difficulties for comprehension for a certain type of mentality that is very popular today. Two elements determine it. Empiricist reductionism, which does not allow for reason to have a philosophical or metaphysical use, (i.e., which reduces rational activity to the ordering and systematization of sensory data). There follows from here—and it is the second element—a very determined concept of nature: nature is not understood as the work of God, but as the object of the mechanic—in the eighteenth century—or as the object of the modern physical-natural sciences. This concept of nature formally means only the legality of spatiotemporal phenomena (cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 165); in this sense, it is claimed that the human intellect is that which produces and dominates nature (*formaliter spectata*: because it formulates the legality which permits its positive scientific comprehension, and not because the mind materially produces corporeal beings). Moral philosophy does not understand the concept of nature in this sense; moralists should take this into account when they hear talk of nature, and, tearing their hair out, are quick to make accusations of ‘biologism’, or of ‘rigid naturalism’, etc. On these two meanings of the concept of nature see Martin, G., *Science moderne et ontologie traditionnelle chez Kant* (PUF: Paris, 1963). In addition to pointing out the existence of these two different interpretations of the term nature—which is an issue of fact that only an apprentice could disregard, as they say—one must question the legitimacy of the modern concept of nature and of the empiricist reductionism that sustains it. The authors of this book believe that such a concept is partially illegitimate, to the exact extent that it is a little ‘empiricist’ (i.e., to the extent that undeniable human experiences are not sufficiently respected). This is, however, not the time to prove our thesis. In any case, it seems true that whoever cannot appreciate the difference between *reproduction* and *procreation* cannot grasp the specifically personalistic facets of human sexuality, and is not able to transcend the standpoint of natural science.

⁴ This affirmation is compatible with various philosophical approaches, provided that they are not rigorously atheistic. The Supreme Being must act through intelligence and love; otherwise He would be inferior to man, generating a contradiction.

⁵ This perspective is correctly developed by C. Caffarra, “La trasmissione della vita nella ‘Familiaris consortio’”, *Medicina e morale* 4 (1983) 391-392.

⁶ Saint Josemaría Escrivá, *Christ Is Passing By* (Dublin: Veritas, 1974).

to us: “The conception of a human person is obviously the consequence of the (normally) free decision of two human people, a man and a woman, to exercise the capacity inscribed in their sexuality. However, there is a very profound vision of these sciences, a standpoint from which the procreative capacity is revealed as a *capacity to cooperate with God* in giving rise to a person; it is a *co-creative*, more than procreative, capacity. Two powers are combined in a mysterious, but real way in the conception of each person: the creative power of God and the co-creative power of man and woman.”⁷

We conclude: the dignity and value of the aspect of sexuality that we are considering resides, then, in that in it the human person has its origin, that is, a being endowed with autonomous meaning that constitutes the highest value in the visible universe. The reference to human existence is an immanent finality and a constitutive meaning of sexuality. That finality and meaning are the subject of absolute respect and not of rule, as is the new personal being who can be brought into existence as a result of the sexual encounter.

However, the dignity and the value of sexuality are increased when sexuality is considered as participation in the divine creation *of the human person*, as the vehicle for the combination of the creativity of divine love with that of human love, or perhaps, as the ambit of an action that is only an action of God: the elevation of the procreative human act to the divine order of creation.

1.2 *Sexuality and Conjugal Communion*

The procreative aspect, even when it is considered in all its human and divine value, does not exhaust the full meaning of human sexuality. One of the characteristics that specifically distinguishes human sexuality from animal sexuality consists in the former being ordered, not only toward the transmission of life, but also toward love. Sexuality opens the possibility of a

⁷ C. Caffarra, *La trasmissione della vita . . .*, 391-392 (our translation of the author’s translation).

unique new embodiment of human love, which constitutes a second reason for the divine likeness and, consequently, a subsequent aggrandizement of human dignity. From the ethical standpoint, it can be said that this fact meets a true necessity. Things cannot be otherwise, inasmuch as the sexual activity represents a point of encounter not between two *sexes*, but between two *people* of the opposite sex, and in the face of the *person* the only right attitude is love. The person can never be utilized as a pure means for achieving a purpose: be this pleasure, procreation, or anything else.

Human sexuality presupposes an interpersonal relationship based in love, and as such has a second significant and axiological dimension: *its unitive meaning and value*. These consist in the fact that sexual union is the expression, while at the same time the fulfillment or consummation, of a prior emotional and spiritual union (dilection), for which man and woman mutually give each other themselves in a way that is *total, exclusive, and definitive*: a surrender that is made before their own conscience, before God, before the State, and before society. In light of the criterion of ethical rationality, the physical union acquires a new positive reason for value if, and only if, it is an integral part of the love with which the man and woman commit entirely to each other until death. Being that sexuality is an existential dimension that involves the entire human person, and is therefore suited for expressing and consummating the total and reciprocal surrender, the physical gift would be intrinsically false and dishonest if it did not answer completely to a previous emotional and spiritual gift, from which any type of present and future reservation were excluded, and for which man and woman—before becoming one flesh—were of one spirit, one heart, one life, and one destiny.

This peculiar and specific characteristic of human sexuality indicates that man and woman, in addition to being called to bring forth life, are called to communion; to the giving of themselves through love. Sexuality exceeds the order of *having*, the order of things that are possessed and utilized, because it actually constitutes a mode of being of the person: being a gift, being called to interpersonal communion.⁸

The authentic realization of this vocation is a positive value in itself. This value is increased if we consider that through it one acquires a new reason

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 392-393.

of likeness with the divine Being. God is love. Being that God created man in His image and likeness, man has been created out of love and is destined *to love*. The human vocation to love and to interpersonal communion is a reflection of the mystery of personal communion of love that God embodies in Himself. In accordance with his condition as incarnate spirit, man fulfills that vocation with his soul and body, so that spiritual love extends to the body and is made a participant of the union of wills.⁹

1.3 *The Axiological Structure of Sexuality*

The conclusion gained in the previous analysis is that human sexuality has two significant and valuable dimensions. The *copresence* of those two meanings appears as the distinctive and specifically human mark of sexuality because both have a sharply personalistic appearance. The worth of the procreative meaning, in effect, is structured around the core of existence as a person. The unitive meaning revolves around the dignity and the good of the spouses as persons called to interpersonal communion. Both aspects make up the full and specifically human meaning of sexuality: if one speaks only of procreation or only of conjugal communion, the full and proper meaning of human sexuality would not be reached and the conclusions that are extracted from that perspective would be partially defective from an ethical standpoint.

It is clear, then, that the *copresence* of the procreative and unitive aspect is the distinctive mark of human sexuality. However, we still do not know how it is structured and the meaning of the union of these two dimensions. The problem should be examined from different points of view: biological, anthropological, axiological, and properly ethical.

⁹ Cf. John Paul II, Exhort. Apost. *Familiaris Consortio*, no. 11. The axiological dimension of sexuality we are considering is greatly accentuated in Christian ethics, for which the physical union fulfills a conjugal union and sacramentally consummates the marriage as the living symbol of communion between God and men and between Christ and the Church: cf. *Ibid.*, nos. 12-13.

Human biology currently has a very precise and detailed cognizance of the way in which the two aspects of human sexuality are naturally structured. We know, for example, that the sexual union does not always result in procreation because feminine fertility is cyclical. Therefore, it is more precise to speak of conjugal union and possible procreation or, perhaps, of the conjugal union that is open to procreation.

Let us approach the issue from the anthropological and axiological standpoint. Procreation and conjugal communion are two goods that are rooted in the value of the person: we have seen this in the previous two sections. They are two dimensions derived from one basic value. Thus, they are not present in human sexuality as conflicting realities—there is no opposition between them; on the contrary, to say so would mean that human sexuality would encompass an internal contradiction, and the same could be said of the ethical structure supported by the value of the person.

However, the relationship between the two dimensions of sexuality is not just one of non-combativeness. Rather, it concerns two values that are so open to each other and that are so enhanced and protected by each other that they actually give rise to a unitary reality on the level of meaning and the anthropological and ethical planes: the love that is fruitful and open to life or procreation as fruit of conjugal love. Let us look at this more carefully.

The requirements of the conjugal communion open themselves to those of procreation. The sexual union—as we have previously said—is the expression and fulfillment of the total gift of oneself. The total gift includes surrender and acceptance of the possibility of paternity/maternity that is inherent to masculinity/femininity. Where these dimensions are deliberately and positively excluded, there cannot be complete and total giving of oneself; and the sexual gesture would be, in itself, false and insincere. The openness to life is a requirement based in the character of totality belonging to the conjugal communion.

On the other hand, the communion of persons that results from and is enlivened by the total surrender constitutes the ideal context for the introduction of a new person into the world. The stable family promotes the good of the new person (his or her individuality, sense of self, education, etc.) in

the best possible way. *There is an ideal suitability between the requirements of the conjugal communion and those of procreation*

The same suitability is seen from the standpoint of the very genesis of the new life. *The conjugal communion is the ambit where the genesis of the human being receives the protection and selfless love that he or she deserves by virtue of his or her status as a person.* There is no better protection for the new life than that guaranteed by the intimacy of conjugal love. It should also be noted that only conjugal love does justice to the dignity of the person: in the face of the person, love is the only just attitude because only in the context of true love is the person recognized and desired for himself or herself. What other approach could encourage the decision to generate a human being? Interest? Some time of need? An expected utility? The satisfaction of some subjective impulse? It seems fairly clear that an adequate correspondence between the procreative process and dignity of the person will only be given if it is commenced by an act of love that is both free and pure. That the procreative activity is in itself an outpouring of selfless love is a requirement of the dignity of the person who is born and, therefore, it is a requirement endowed with value, and not simply a natural fact.

This value increases if we consider, with Caffarra, the level of the ultimate foundation of personal values. “The creative activity of God is in its essence the most intimate activity of love. Why? The reason is that it is a free activity. God has no need of any of us; none of us are necessary. If we exist, it is because God willed us gratuitously and freely. The participation of man and the woman in the creative activity of God cannot but be based in an act of love; there cannot be more than this. This is the reason why it is no coincidence that it is one and the same act in which the spouses surrender themselves in love and the act of setting into motion the conditions leading to the conception of the human person.”¹⁰ With creation being a fruit of divine love, the fact that procreation or the participation of man in this divine act is in itself an act of human love and not merely the fruit of such love is not a coincidence but a reality full of meaning and of value: something that must be so.

¹⁰ C. Caffarra, “Definizione filosofico-etica e teologica della procreazione responsabile”, in *La procreazione responsabile. Fondamenti . . .*, cit. pp. 394-396 (our translation of the author’s translation).

From the other point of view, it should be noted that *the demands of procreation begin at the time of true conjugal love*. The dignity of the person demands that children are the fruit of their parents' love, not of violence, an instinctive outburst, or lack of self-control on the part of sexual partners. The children are also a common good for their parents, a living symbol and the fruit of their love; the children strengthen the mutual union of the spouses, whose stability and harmony is required for sustaining and educating their children.

On the other hand, *openness to life guards the quality of conjugal love*. The conjugal union is a "context of personal expression whose integrity consists in joyfully forgetting oneself. Such integrity should not be sacrificed for the sake of a consequentialist functionalism, limiting the multiple functions of this context in the finalistic-rational sense."¹¹ If the joyful self-forgetting in the surrender is offset by precaution or manipulative intervention, which deprives sexuality of one of its meanings and of its valuable dimensions, the relationship ceases to be a loving relationship because both individuals treat each other as objects of pleasure. "Love will be no more, in either of the persons or between them, it will not be an objective reality, for there is no objective good to ensure its existence. 'Love' in this utilitarian conception is a union of egoisms, which can hold together only on condition that they confront each other with nothing unpleasant, nothing to conflict with their mutual pleasure. Therefore love so understood is self-evidently merely a pretense which has to be carefully cultivated to keep the underlying reality hidden: the reality of egoism, and the greediest kind of egoism at that, exploiting another person to obtain for itself its own 'maximum pleasure'. In such circumstances the other person is and remains only a means to an end, as Kant rightly observed in his critique of utilitarianism."¹²

Ultimately, where there is no total surrender of one's own self (in which is included potential paternity and maternity), sexual activity implies the utilization of the other as an object to promote one's *own* pleasure. Such an

¹¹ R. Speamann, "La responsabilità personale e il suo fondamento," in Various Authors., *Etica teleologica o etica deontologica? Un dibattito al centro della teologia morale odierna*, "Documenti CRIS", nos. 49-50 (Rome: 1983), 22 (our translation of the author's translation).

¹² K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 39.

embodiment of the sexual union implies treating another person as a mere means to achieve subjective satisfaction, and, on the other hand, to betray the vocation to interpersonal communion. It is indeed clear that this type of union would only last as long as the pleasure and physical enjoyment last, and that spiritual communion would not come to exist, since this requires a shared good, and this physical pleasure can never be common between the two of them: each of the partners incommunicably enjoys his or her own, even if it is obtained conjugally or with the help of the other.

To recapitulate: the *copresence* of the procreative and unitive aspects that specifically characterize human sexuality emerges, then, as a strong structure that encompasses meaning and values of invaluable scope. The union of both aspects is not a simple fact lacking in meaning, but one which has a clear and easily intelligible meaning: it guarantees and reinforces the specifically personal values that involve human sexuality, namely, the values brought into play by the fact that *human persons* are just as much generators as generated.

The translation from the preceding analyses to the properly ethical plane reads like this: the *copresence* of the unitive and procreative meanings *is a value and not a simple natural fact; an ethical necessity and not just a biological necessity; a legal necessity and not just a factual necessity; something that should be so and not just something that is so.*¹³ There are examples in human beings of both connections of fact and connections of law which can facilitate the intuitive understanding of what we are saying. A connection of fact exists, for example, between one part of the tube through which we breathe and the part of the tube through which we feed. It is something that is the case, but it does not seem that particular values are encompassed in such a connection of fact. It could be otherwise. In contrast, it is a connection of law that exists between morality and happiness: whoever perseveres in the moral effort should, at least in the end, be happy; to think otherwise causes a scandal of reason. A connection of law, on the other hand, is that a given tendency follows knowledge: sensitive knowledge is followed by a sensible tendency; rational knowledge is followed by rational or voluntary love. A being endowed with universal knowledge but without a rational tendency, endowed only with sensitive impulses, would be a more deformed and ornery

¹³ Cf. C. Caffarra, *La trasmissione della vita . . .*, pp. 394-396.

monster than a man with two heads. For the separation the two aspects of human sexuality is equally contrary to reason.

What we have just said implies that, on the operational plane, the two aspects of human sexuality are *ethically coessential* and *ethically inseparable* for two reasons: 1) because their union constitutes the determinate value of the axiological structure of human sexuality; and 2) because their dissociation does not only imply the injury of the excluded value, but also the perversion and devaluation of the one that remains. As this constitutive union of the axiological structure of sexuality is a function of the values of the person, its value is as absolute as the distinction between people and the things that sustain them.¹⁴ The way in which the two aspects of human sexuality open up to each other, the way they reinforce and protect each other, as well as their specific personalistic meaning, show that their *ethical inseparability* occurs in both directions. Procreation is inseparable from conjugal communion and vice versa. In both cases identical values are at stake: the value and dignity of the person that can reach the existence, value, and dignity of the people who engage in sexual activity. Let us proceed to drawing out the operative ethical consequences

2 Ethical Consequences

Moral principles derived from the anthropological and axiological structure of sexuality are basically two. The first may be formulated like so: *sexual activity is ethically valuable when it is performed within the context of marriage*. The criterion of ethical rationality is contradicted when it takes place outside of marriage or against marriage (adultery).

The second principle says that *any exercise of sexuality in the context of marriage must respect the ethical inseparability between its two aspects: the*

¹⁴ The ethical inseparability of the two meanings of human sexuality is a fundamental point of the conjugal moral teachings of the Catholic Church. Cf. Pius XI, Enc. *Casi Connubii*, AAS 22 (1930), 560; Paul VI, Enc. *Humane vitae*, no. 12; John Paul II, Exhort. Apos. *Familiaris Consortio*, no. 32.

interpersonal communion of the spouses and the openness to potential procreation. This criterion says that human sexuality must be respected in the *fullness* of its meaning, it must always be exercised in a *true and totally* human way because it is insufficient when exercised in a merely partial respect. The same can be said in other words: sexuality cannot be instrumentalized, it cannot be treated as a simple means that is available for the embodiment of a design that is *extraneous* to its intrinsic meaning and truth—meaning and truth which, as we have seen, are not simple, but which consist in a structure of personal values. The reasons that justify the ethical impossibility of treating human sexuality as an instrumentality are the following: 1) for the personalistic character of the values enclosed and protected by the axiological structure of human sexuality, it cannot be treated instrumentally without, *ipso facto*, the person himself or herself being instrumentalized; 2) if one intends to promote one of the aspects of sexuality through instrumental treatment, it is probable that the other aspect will be intentionally injured or deformed, and in any case the same value that one wishes to promote will end up forced and unnatural, at least in those specific characteristics that make it a personal value.

Not even the Author of Nature instrumentalizes human sexuality. God did not conjure up the sexual impulse to *use* people for the sake of a purpose that was extraneous to them. On the contrary, human sexuality would remain deformed under any aspect; specifically, one would reach a rigorous and puritanical conception of sexuality, in which the joy that accompanies the exercise of the sexual faculty would be evil in itself; it would be tolerated inasmuch as it is strongly connected with the transmission of life, that is to say, inasmuch as it is a necessary evil. Such a conception is repugnant to a more basic ethical sensibility and to a more balanced understanding of the relationship between God and people.¹⁵ Men and women exercise sexual activity freely and responsibly, and this activity is valuable in itself if they remain bound to conjugal love. Sexuality is ordered toward life, but also toward love. Being able to recognize and accept the values encompassed by

¹⁵ Cf. the critique of the rigorous interpretation of sexuality by K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 58-61. The rigorous conception of sexuality certainly is not part of a correct interpretation of Christianity. “Thus, sex is not a shameful thing; it is a divine gift, ordained to life, to love, to fruitfulness. This is the context in which we must see the Christian doctrine on sex.” (Saint Josemaría Escrivá, *Christ Is Passing By*, no. 24).

sexuality as a common good between the spouses, the sexual impulse can be integrated into the link that unites two people: it can be integrated into spiritual love, and can be an expression and complement of the total gift involved in love. In all of this there is neither the shadow of utilization—forgive the redundancy—in the utilitarian sense of this term; what actually happens is that, as we previously said, God gives man the possibility of a new and unique embodiment of love and a second reason for the divine likeness.

Having made this clarification, we can break down the diverse consequences contained in this second moral criterion. The first and most clear consequence is that one aspect of sexuality does not come about *in opposition* to the other: the performance of one cannot deliberately and positively exclude the other. This happens, in a way, in contraception. In the other sense it would happen in acts of sexual violence which are not closed to procreation or, without going to these extremes, when the pretension of one spouse does not take into account the particular needs—physical, psychological, spiritual—of the other, when he or she is forced, in one way or another, into conjugal communion. It is, in short, that the two aspects of sexuality are values that are not subordinated, but coordinated in their practical implementation. To say that they do not become subordinate, we want to note only that neither of those two dimensions can be instrumentalized for obtaining the other (i.e., neither of them can be forced or perverted in order to facilitate the completion of the other).¹⁶ However, ethical inseparability does not only mean that an aspect of sexuality cannot be performed contrary to the other within

¹⁶ What we are saying refers to the *way* in which it would be impermissible to promote one of these two goods. This problem is different than that of the ends of marriage. The tradition in moral philosophy has been to distinguish a primary (procreation) and a secondary end (mutual support) of marriage. The context in which such concepts were coined is that of the determination of the *raison d'être* which, from the objective ontological standpoint, explain the existence of the institution of marriage. In that sense, it becomes clear that the existence or subsistence of humanity, of the world of personal beings, is a *raison* of greater weight: it is primary. However talking about a primary end and secondary end was never intended to justify lack of respect for the person of the opposite sex or to say that it was lawful to violate or to force conjugal communion, nor does it mean that marriage was not lawful when procreation was impossible due to natural causes. These erroneous interpretations of the traditional terminology can be excluded both by the context in which the hierarchy of purposes is proposed, and because secondary in reference to the end means it is a second end, and not an unimportant end that can be done without.

marriage, or that it is unlawful to procure the other by force. It also means that, even within marriage, one aspect cannot be performed *without the other, separately from the other, and apart from the other*. The ethical world is the world of freedom, therefore, the expressions ‘without’, ‘separately’ and ‘apart from’ are understood under the implicit clause: ‘in what depends on human liberty’. It means, therefore, that the axiological structure of sexuality remains injured by all separation that is deliberated and positively procured, and not only by that which results from the negation or intentional injury of one of the aspects of sexuality. The precise axiological structure of human sexuality implies that the exercise of the procreative faculty cannot be animated by a diverse logic from that of conjugal love open to life. To separate procreation and personal union, even with the subjective intention of promoting one or the other, is in any case an instrumental treatment of sexuality (i.e., a treatment of sexuality that does not respect the fullness of its specifically human meaning), and which will lead to the injury—intentionally or through subjective intentions—of some of its specifically personal values.